

Executive Registry
77-8116/1

22
27 June 77

7 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Suggestion for a TV Program

Heartening as it is to learn that a commercial television network is interested in producing one or more programs on "CIA successes", and disheartening as it is to watch the prestige and credibility afforded to the views of any and all detractors of American intelligence in the name of preserving "the adversary relationship" between the media and the government, I find little to commend NBC's idea. In the context of present-day television attitudes, the more one thinks of the old adage "An intelligence success revealed is an intelligence failure", the better it sounds.

Principally, I cannot see a way of making a "CIA success", i.e., the result of a discrete intelligence process (not to say operation), into a meaningful television spectacle (the connotations of this word are not entirely accidental) without giving the viewer information -- on sources and methods, people and places, times and circumstances.

Some intelligence stories have been told, in various ways, at various costs, to various advantages -- Cuban missile crisis, U-2 overflights of the USSR, Khrushchev's secret speech, Penkovsky's papers. Are there any other successes we can tell without turning them into failures, and without jeopardizing successes in the future? I think not.

Anyway, there are no intelligence successes that are credibly important to the public -- only policy successes. And that, of course, is as it should be. Occasionally, one hopes, a president might give appropriate credit to intelligence for the success of a policy decision, and, occasionally, presidents do that.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECOVERY FILE *Pub Affs*)

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Otherwise, the "intelligence success" is either an operation in which professionals can take pride and which they must protect from publicity; or a complex, sophisticated, and inspired analysis resulting in a brilliantly accurate ("perceptive" is not enough) estimate; or collection, analysis, and production well done day in and day out. None of them makes a good television program.

I have discussed the suggestion with Paul Walsh and he finds it objectionable, mainly on the grounds outlined in the second paragraph, above. Without presumption, I think that DDO would find it at best equally difficult to suggest a tractable topic for NBC.



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77-8116

27 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant to the Director
(Public Affairs)

SUBJECT: Possible NBC Special Program on
"CIA Successes"

1. We have had two meetings with NBC Executives to discuss the possibility of a program about CIA. One idea which surfaced during discussions is of considerable interest to NBC--producing a special program or programs concerning "CIA successes." One method of doing so would involve telling the story of one such success which occurred during the tenure of the seven most recent DCI's (Turner, Bush, Colby, Schlesinger, Helms, Raborn, McCone). In this way NBC would involve each in the story which occurred during his time in office.

2. I would very much appreciate your thoughts and recommendations on how we might proceed from here. I would guess some basic research is necessary to determine if success stories exist which are either unclassified or which might be realistically considered for declassification.

Herbert E. Hetu

cc DCI
DDCI
DDA
DDO
DDS&T
OCR
HIC

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

Paul Alfano

The Washington Star

225 Virginia Avenue, S.E.

Washington, D.C. 20061

Executive Registry

8-18-77

77-5533

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C., 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

I had an experience yesterday which left me wondering about the purpose of your "Public Affairs Office."

The question I had was not what I would consider a very difficult one. I wanted to know the exact title and spelling of the name of a former CIA official--Carl Duckett.

In mid-afternoon I called the public affairs office and gave the question to a woman who answered the phone. Someone would be back to me shortly, she said.

About an hour later, at 4 p.m., I made what appears in retrospect to be my major mistake of the afternoon; I went to the bathroom. When I returned I was told that a [redacted] had called from the CIA.

I called back and was told that [redacted] was in a meeting. An hour later I called back again and was told [redacted] was in a meeting. At 6 p.m. I was told that [redacted] was in a meeting that "would last the rest of the afternoon."

Unless there are some national security problems surrounding the identity of Duckett--and I tend to doubt that--I am at a loss to know why someone could not take the two minutes necessary to look up his name, title and relay the information to me over the phone.

Perhaps the office of Public Affairs is a cover for some other form of activity, such as holding internal conferences. If that is so perhaps you could carry out your mandate to de-mystify the non-security aspects of the CIA by changing the office's name to "non-public affairs" or some similar title that wouldn't mislead us.

Sincerely,

John J. Fialka

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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TO:

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2	DDCI				
3	D/DCI/IC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	A/DCI/PA	✓			
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
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SUSPENSE _____
Date _____

Remarks:

may want to
respond to this.

[Signature]
Executive Secretary
8/22/72
Date

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

[Signature]

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